The tax preference for interest payments by corporations as compared to dividend payments is a long surviving feature of many tax systems. Many have argued that there is no reason for this preference and so it distorts the capital structure of corporations needlessly. This article argues that because the returns to equity are more positively skewed as compared to debt, individual investors will tend to value equity more than they would value it given only its mean and variance characteristics. The article goes on to argue that in the social aggregate only the mean and variance characteristics persist. As a result, this article argues that the tax preference for debt capitalization instead of equity capitalization may help to align social and individual incentives in investment. The article also discusses how other considerations might diminish or even reverse the sign of the optimal preference for debt. However, this article argues that it is not the case that there is no argument for such a preference based on the nature of the returns to debt and the returns to equity.
Introduction
One of the most commonly criticized features of the taxation of business income is the difference in the taxation of corporate income allocated to debt and that allocated equity.
2 Under the U.S. tax system and those of many other countries, income allocated to creditors is taxed at a lower rate than income allocated to shareholders. This results from the fact that interest income is generally deductible to corporations as a cost of business, 3 while generally dividend payments are not deductible. 4 To the extent that corporate investment is held by individuals, both interest payments 3 preference for debt financing based on differences between the returns as received by the investors and those returns when viewed from a societal perspective. That is, because the aggregate characteristics of returns differ from those observed by individuals there is an argument for a tax preference for debt over equity.
The basic argument is based on two workhorse models in economics: log utility and the Merton model of corporate capital structure. These models are arguably the most standard models in their respective domains. However, these models do make fairly stylized assumptions. After setting forth the arguments based on these models, this article will show that one can relax these assumptions in some fairly realistic ways and that the argument of the article still obtains.
Section I discusses some of the mathematical background for the argument. Section II will set forth the basic argument based on the main models used in this paper. Section III then discusses the effect of relaxing these assumptions of these models. In particular, it discusses the effect of allowing for a more general form of utility function known as constant relative risk aversion ("CRRA") of which log utility is a special case. This section shows that relaxing the assumptions in this way will actually make the case stronger. It also discusses the effect of weakening of the assumption of independence of returns from earlier returns. In addition, Section III will also discuss some of the limitations of the arguments in this article as well as attempting to assess how important these limitations are.
Section I. Statistical Background
Before beginning the main discussion in Section II, this section reviews a few relatively fundamental results relating to the cumulants of a probability distribution. These will be used frequently in the discussion, but they can be skipped by those familiar with cumulants and those only interested in the intuition behind the results rather than closely following the mathematical arguments themselves.
The discussion assumes that random variables addressed have a probability density function, ( ).
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The nth order cumulant of a distribution , ( ) is defined as
4
Where ( ) = ∫ ( ) . 11 The normalized cumulant is defined as
Where is the standard deviation of the distribution. The skewness of random variables is defined as the normalized third order cumulant. 12 Skewness is a standard measure of the asymmetry of a distribution. Under some reasonable assumptions, 13 this has a convenient mathematical form:
Where [•] is the expectation operator. We note that the normalized cumulant is scale independent because the power of the numerator is the same as the denominator. That is, if is the skewness of a particular random variable , the skewness of scaled version, , where is a constant, is = . This means that one can multiply a random variable by a constant and this transformation does not change the value of the normalized cumulant. 14 The key implication of this for the argument of this article is that the scaling a stochastic process by a multiplier for time or other types of aggregation does not change the skewness of the value of the process.
In the case of independent random variables, the cumulant of the sum of the variables is the sum of cumulants. 15 This follows because the cumulants are based on logarithms. 16 So the cumulant of the sum of N independent variables is simply N times the average value of the cumulant for those variables. As a result the normalized cumulant of the sum of N independent and identically distributed,
11 ( ) is often referred to as the characteristic function, also known as the Fourier transformation of the pdf of the variable . Page 22 of Bouchard and Potters 12 See Bouchard and Potters p. 22 equation (1.53) 13 The assumptions include that the distribution has a finite third moment. 14 Indeed, the same is true for affine transformations, more generally. 15 This follows from the fact that for independent distributions, the joint distribution ( , ) = ( ) ( ), where ( ) is the marginal distribution of x. 16 That is, the cumulant of the sum of two variables + would be based on the function log ( ) which given the independence of the variables can be written as log
Because differentiation is a linear operator, we can then see that the cumulant of the sum of independent variables will be equal to the sum of the cumulants.
Note that because the th order normalized cumulant is divided by the standard deviation raised to the th power, any cumulant of order > 2 will decrease with power as the number of terms in the sum, , increases. Based on a similar argument it can be shown that expected value of the sum of random variables is equal to the sum of the expected values. This result holds even if the variables are highly dependent. For a sum of independent variables, the skewness of the sum decreases with the square root of the number of variables in the sum. This is true for the sum of any independent random variables, whether identically distributed or not as long as the skewness of the individual terms does not increase without limit.
Random variables that follow a Gaussian distribution have a skewness equal to zero (that is, they are symmetric) and a kurtosis equal to three or an excess kurtosis equal to zero. This follows from the cumulant generating function for the Gaussian distribution which is ( ) = + (derived from equation (1)). Each distribution meeting the assumptions of this section has an associated cumulant generating function derived from equation (1). Unfortunately, few of these cumulant generating functions are analytic. The cumulant generating function for a Gaussian distribution tells us that all the odd moments are equal to zero and the even "excess moments" are also equal to zero. Putting this another way, the mean and variance are sufficient statistics for the Gaussian distribution. That is, to match the distribution of a normally or locally-normally distributed variable 17 one needs only know the mean and variance. That why they can be designated by ~ ( , ) which fully specifies the distribution.
One conclusion is that since the higher moments of a Gaussian variable are zero, the sum of such variables will also have higher order cumulants equal to zero. That is, the sum will also have a normal distribution. While this is not a rigorous proof of this notion, it does give some indication of why it is true.
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Section II Basic Argument 17 By a locally normal distribution, I mean distribution which at any finite time are normally distributed. So for example, at any finite time, a Brownian motion is normally distributed. One has to restrict this to finite time because at any finite time T because a process such as a Brownian motion as a whole has an infinite distribution. 18 
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The argument in favor of a tax preference for debt in this article proceeds in four major steps. The first major step is to show that individual investors prefer corporate equity investments and discount corporate debt investments in excess of the mean and variance characteristics of these investments.
This argument is based on the notion that individuals have a preference for positively skewed returns.
As will be shown based on the Merton model of corporate capital structure, even when the income generated by corporations is symmetrically distributed, corporate equity returns have a positively skewed distribution and the returns to corporate debt are have a negatively skewed distribution.
Putting these together means that individuals will prefer the returns of corporate equity more than they would if the evaluation was based on its mean and variance characteristics. Similarly, individual investors will discount corporate debt more than they would just based on its mean and variance characteristics.
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The second step in the argument is that in aggregation both the positive skewness of equity and the negative skewness of debt dissipate based on the functional central limit theorem. One of the most important results in statistics proven in the twentieth century is that under some fairly weak conditions additive stochastic processes asymptotically approach a local Gaussian distribution. 20 Following the properties of the Gaussian distribution as discussed in Section I.B , this means that these aggregate distributions asymptotically lose their skewness as well as their higher order normalized cumulants. The argument made in this section makes a simplifying assumption: namely that daily returns on stocks and bonds are independent and identically distributed. Section III will discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption.
Third, based on the second step in the argument, there is a difference in societal incentives and individual incentives with respect to investment returns. Because society views investments from an aggregate perspective, it is only those characteristics that persist in the aggregate that are of interest to society as a whole. If the total returns within a society are additive, then the dissipation of higher moments discussed in the second step of the argument indicates that only the mean and variance characteristics of an investment are of concern to society. The first step of the argument showed that because individuals value positive skewness, they will invest more highly in corporate equity than would 7 be the case if they only considered the mean and variance characteristics. The final step in the argument is that the differences between individual and societal incentives justifies the higher tax burden on the income on corporate equity as compared to income on corporate debt because the returns to equity are positively skewed, while those to debt are negatively skewed. This creates an argument for a tax incentive to move individuals away from positively skewed investments and toward those that are negatively skewed. To put this in different terms, each of us wants everyone else in society to be mean-variance optimizers because their wealth will be greater than if they also value other attributes of returns such as skewness.
A. Individual Investor Preference for Positively Skewed Results
Valuation of Corporate Equity and Corporate Debt
One of the most standard models for considering the differences in the returns to corporate equity as opposed to those of corporate debt is the model proposed by Robert Merton. 21 This section will discuss how this model holds that the returns on corporate equity will be a convex functions of the returns to the business of the corporation while the returns on the debt of the corporation will be a concave function of the corporate returns. This difference in the curvature of equity and debt in turn leads to 8 the conclusion that the returns on corporate equity will be more positively skewed than the returns on corporate debt.
The Merton model views the returns to corporate equity as similar to the returns on a call option on the corporate assets. In this analogy, the strike price of the call option would be the amount of the debt of the corporation. The returns on corporate debt are essentially the same as those of having written a put on the assets of the corporation. The idea is that because the payoff to debt is at most the full payment of the principal and interest, while the maximum payoff to equity is unlimited.
In order to come to this conclusion, certain stylized assumptions are made. This model assumes that there are two time periods. In the first period, the investors purchase corporate equity and corporate debt. Then in the second period, the results of the corporate operations become known. At this time the equity investors can decide to pay the debt and then retain the corporate assets in excess of the value of the debt. If the value of the corporation is less than the principal amount of the debt, the value of the stock drops to zero and the debt holders take the assets of the company.
From the diagrams we can see the convexity and concavity of equity and debt. [See Diagram I and
Diagram II]. This convexity increases the positive skewness of the returns to equity. Conversely, the concavity of the returns to debt increases the negative skewness of the returns to debt.
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A well known result in option pricing literature is that the value of call options is increasing in risk. 23 As a result equity holders would likely prefer for the corporation to take on more risk than debt holders would prefer. This occurs because the equity holders will receive the benefits of the risky investment, while if the investment fails, it is the debt holders who will likely suffer. The conflict between the equity holders and debt holders in this context leaves the results of the effect of any particular capitalization structure on corporate decision-making theoretically indeterminate. 24 Debt holders may demand limitations in the debt covenants preventing the equity holders from taking on more risk or they may not. Without restrictions, equity holders would prefer to take greater risks, unless they wish to enter the debt markets in the future in which case they will include the interest costs in their calculations. REV. 261 (1958) result, the decisions of the corporate management on how to operate the company will depend on factors other than the capital structure of the corporation.
The Structure of the Investor Utility Function
The portfolio theory that emerged from the 1950s and 1960s held that investors should look to the mean and variance of their portfolios. This line of analysis led to what is known as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Almost immediately after the standard consumption based arguments for the CAPM were introduced, critiques arose that individuals will not be mean-variance optimizers. In order for individuals to be mean-variance optimizers, essentially one of two things would have to be true:
Either returns on investments would have to be normally distributed, or individuals would have to have quadratic utility. Those critiquing the CAPM noted that it does not appear that stock returns are normally distributed (at least in the short run) and that individuals do not have quadratic utility, in part because quadratic utility would contradict important aspect of observed behavior. As a result of these critiques, a strand of the literature began to consider asset pricing theories based on the higher moments of the distribution of returns, such as skewness and kurtosis. That is, if the returns to assets are not fully described by their mean and variance and if individuals are concerned about these additional characteristics, then the mean-variance analysis should be insufficient to describe market activity.
Arrow discussed certain features that should be required of any utility functions. 25 Among the desirable properties of a utility function is that it should exhibit risk aversion (negative second moments), but this risk aversion should be decreasing in wealth (positive third moments). Arditti showed that for this to be the case the utility function must a preference for a positive third moment, and that this is equivalent to a preference for positive skewness.
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Kraus and Litzenberger show 27 that one can look at a Taylor expansion of a utility function to determine the skewness preference of that utility function. Namely
So for a utility function to be useful, we expect that > 0, < 0, and that > 0. skewed investments. Therefore, we can conclude that investors will prefer the return structure of corporate equity over those of corporate debt which have the same mean-variance characteristics.
B. Aggregation Reduces Skewness
In section A, we saw that individuals appear to exhibit preferences which depend on higher moments of returns. In particular, for our purposes there is a preference for positive skewness and a discount for negative skewness.
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Arguably one of most important results in statistics is that under fairly reasonable assumptions, additive accumulations of random variables asymptotically approach a Brownian motion. A Brownian motion is the additive accumulations of variables which are normally distributed. 31 The various versions of these results are referred to as functional central limit theorems.
This section will discuss the application of a functional central limit theorem to a stylized case to illustrate the nature of the argument for a debt preference. Section III will address the effects of relaxing these assumptions so as to make the model more closely match observed preferences.
For the argument in this section, I will use log returns of financial assets. Log returns of financial assets are commonly used in the academic finance literature. The log return of an asset is simply the difference 11 in the logarithms of price of the asset before and after the period being covered. That is, the log return for the period to + 1 is equal to = = − .
Why use the log returns and not the simple returns? 32 While log returns are often used in the financial literature because they approximate simple returns for short periods of time, the reason they are used here is different. The approximation argument only hold for short periods of time. As the returns become larger, the larger the difference between log returns and simple returns becomes larger.
Because the main thrust of the argument of this article considers long aggregate periods of time, the approximation argument is not all that useful. 33 Rather there are two main justifications for the use of log returns: first, if one assumes the individuals have log utility functions then log returns are naturally used and second, log returns have some very useful mathematical properties.
The first justification for the use of log returns is that we will initially assume that individuals have utility functions which are the logarithm of their individual wealth ("log utility") . In symbols, this means that the utility of the ith person, ( ) = log . Many economic models have been justified at least partly by the use of logarithmic utility. 34 If individuals' utilities are represented by log utility, then there is a natural and obvious relationship between log returns and utility functions. By looking at log returns we are essentially looking directly at the utility effects of the investments. One should note that logarithmic utility is a special case of constant relative risk aversion class of utility functions which arguably the most commonly used class of utility functions in the academic finance literature. This more general class of utility functions is further discussed in Section III.
One might note that the log utility function meets the basic requirements needed for our present purposes. A log utility function exhibits the correct signs for the first three moments of the function (discussed above). In particular, log utility exhibits a preference for positive skewness. We can see this by looking at the Taylor expansion of the logarithmic utility as discussed in section II.A. The third derivative of the log utility function is
= . This is positive as long as > 0 , (that is as long as wealth is positive) which we will assume in this discussion. So we can see that log utility generates a 32 Simple returns are defined as = . Log returns are a continuously compounded version of simple returns. So if we use as a base period one which is very small, log returns and simple returns will approximate each other. 33 Connor, Goldberg and Korajczyk, PORTFOLIO RISK ANALYSIS (2010) 34 Log utility can be used to prove the CAPM results (cite) for continuously compounded multiperiod investment optimization. Log utility models are to some degree based on the work in the 19 th century of Weber and Fechner, who found that perceptual sensitivity seemed to be based on a logarithmic function. [cite] positive skewness preference. That is, because the sign of the third moment of the function is positive, logarithmic utility exhibits a positive preference for skewness.
The other major justification of log returns are their useful mathematical properties. One of the useful mathematical properties of log returns is that they are additive. That is, the returns over a time period that encompasses N periods is simply the summation of the log returns for those N periods. 35 For example, the log returns from day 1 to day 100 can be written as , = + + ⋯ + . 36 One can see that the cumulative log returns follow an additive random walk. It turns out that this property is the key to the argument of this section.
In the simple case being made in this section, we will assume that log returns are independent and identically distributed. Importantly, this assumes that neither the expected value, nor any of the higher order cumulants of the distribution are time varying. Section III will discuss the effect of relaxing this assumption.
The reason why the additive nature of the returns is important is that under some fairly reasonable conditions an additive random walk eventually follows a functional central limit theorem. If a functional central limit theorem applies, then we can conclude that the random walk of additive log returns of investments should eventually converge in distribution to a Brownian motion. Because a Brownian motion is the summation of independent normally distributed random variables, it has no skewness or excess kurtosis. In essence, the process which is a summation of random variables is effectively normally distributed.
There are many versions of the functional central limit theorem. Initially, because of the assumptions we have made in this section we can use one of the simplest of these known as Donsker's theorem.
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Formally, Donsker's Theorem requires that a set of random variables , , … be i.i.d with a distribution function ( ), which has mean 0 and variance 1. Under this theorem we define as:
This is not true for simple returns. These follow a process known as either a multiplicative random walk or a geometric random walk. The statistical properties of these processes are much more complicated. 36 If the return on any given day, can be written as . 37 
=
Where is a Weiner process. That is, the sum of the random variables converges in distribution to a process which is the sum of random variables where each element of the sum, , is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of 1. Of course, since the sum of normally distributed variables is also normally distributed, we can see that as long as is finite, will also be normally distributed.
Another way that the results of the theorem are commonly expressed is that we could also say that the This version of Donsker's theorem tells us that a scaled version of the summation process will converge in distribution to a Brownian motion with a known mean and standard deviation. We can note that since skewness and the other higher order cumulants are independent of scaling (see eq. 4) , the scaling factor of √ is not relevant. The skewness (third-order normalized cumulant) of the both the process √ and the process will approach zero. Indeed, essentially Eq. (4) gives us this result specifically with respect to skewness. The intuition is that we can scale the random walk = ∑ and retain the same skewness. Donsker's theorem tells us that we can scale it so that it asymptotically matches a Brownian motion on the interval [0,1].
Even without Donsker's theorem, equation (4) tells us that the third order cumulant of the sum of variables reduces on the order of √ . Higher order cumulants reduce even faster. So we can 38 This means that the cumulative distribution function of converges to 14 appreciate the speed at which the random walk will begin to approximate a Brownian motion. However, mean and variance of the process do not decrease as n increases.
From Eq. (4) one can also get a sense of how quickly the skewness dissipates. That equation shows that all of the normalized cumulants of order greater than 2 of a sum of independent random variables asymptotically dissipate, as long as the underlying variables do not have infinite skewness or kurtosis.
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The third moment dissipates with the square root of the number of variables added. So we see from this that because the log returns follow an additive process, the distribution of this additive process will asymptotically approach a normal distribution. To relate this back to corporate equity and debt, the process which is the logarithm of stock values (indeed the log of societal wealth) will asymptotically approach a Brownian motion. Asymptotically, this process does not have positive or negative skewness.
One can note that Donsker's theorem is more general than the cumulant argument made above.
Donsker's theorem only assumes that the distribution of the random variables that make up the random process has a finite expected value and variance. It does not assume that the distribution has finite higher moments. The normalized cumulant argument given above assumes that the distribution have finite third moments. So we can see that the asymptotic argument is more general than one might suspect from examining eq (4).
To apply this simple version of the functional central limit theorem to the returns on investments, we need to assume that the returns on different days or any other unit over which we are aggregating are independent. Even if the processes which generates these individual daily returns are not normally distributed, under the assumptions that the distribution that generates these returns has sufficient finite moments, the functional central limit theorem tells us that the distribution of the sum of these random variables will be normally distributed with mean equal to the sum of the means and a variance equal to the sum of the variances (assuming they are independent, which is not exactly true).
We then have that the process of the sum of the variables will lose its skewness, excess kurtosis and other higher moments. The intuition is that in adding variables the central tendencies (expected value and variance) add while the higher moments tend to dissipate. (see eq. 4) So when looked at from a larger aggregate perspective the returns are effectively the same as if they had been the result of a 39 A common distribution which would have infinite skewness would be a t distribution which has a shape 15 normally distributed process. The key to the use of a functional central limit theorem is additive aggregation.
One might be concerned that the theorem assumes that each term in the process has a mean of zero and a variance of one. We do not have to assume that in fact each step in the return process has a mean of zero and variance of 1 in order for the higher moments of the distribution to dissipate asymptotically due to additive aggregations. We first note that since we are initially assuming that returns are independent and identically distributed, then we can express the expected value of the returns in each period as and the standard deviation of the returns in each period as . Once we have the mean and standard deviation of each return, we can then consider the process of . These transformed returns would be referred to as standardized returns. 40 As noted before addition and subtraction by a constant as well as scaling the variable by a constant does not alter the higher order normalized cumulants. Therefore using this scaled process will not result in different higher order cumulants than those of the actual return distribution. So now we have a process which conforms to the requirements of the theorem, in that it has a mean of zero and a variance of one.
If we wish to generalize this random walk to allow for non-identical distributions (but still independent distributions) this is quite simple to do. If the distributions of the returns are time varying, but not dependent on the outcome of the process itself, we could express the relevant statistics as and .
That is, if the mean and standard deviation of the returns are determined by exogenous macroeconomics forces but not by prior values of the process, we could still call the distributions of returns at each individual time period independent. Note then that the individual returns would no longer be identically distributed. If we do this then we could then consider the process , which will have mean of zero and a variance of 1. So we have now allowed for a slight generalization of the argument. The returns on investments do not have to be identically distributed. We can have time varying expected returns and time varying variance of these returns.
C. Society is Interested in Additive Aggregations
The prior section has shown that additive aggregations will (under the assumptions made)
asymptotically reduce skewness to zero. In addition, the rate of dissipation is proportional to the square root of the number of variables in the sum. A reasonable first reaction to this argument might be that 16 this might be of mathematical interest, but one might wonder how this relates to taxation of corporate debt (a negatively skewed instrument) versus corporate equity (a positively skewed investment).
There are at least three ways in which societal aggregation will reduce or eliminate the higher order cumulants of the return distributions such as skewness. First, if society has a longer time horizon than individuals, the returns that interest society will exhibit less skewness. That is, if society has a longer time horizon, more time periods will play a role in the calculations. The larger the number of returns in the aggregation, the less important the skewness of the individual returns. The skewness observed by individuals will dissipate over the period of interest to society, and so society will have essentially no interest in the skewness of investment returns. That is, because society as a whole does not observe the skewness that individuals observe, society has an interest in encouraging individuals to ignore the skewness of return distributions.
Second, aggregation over individuals should also reduce skewness to the extent that returns across By definition, society observes both the returns to corporate debt and equity and so the premium for equity and the penalty for debt do not make sense from a societal perspective. We see then that adding together the payoff to corporate debt and the payoff to corporate equity results in the overall distribution of the returns to corporate equity. This is the distribution that will be observed by society as a whole, yet there will be an incentive to place more of a price on corporate equity and a lower price on debt that would exist individuals simply examined the mean and variance characteristics of the investments.
D. The Social Externality of Wealth.
One might claim that the argument for societal involvement in return characteristics as given above seems weak. This argument might be made more persuasive by framing it a more standard manner used for justifying tax preferences or imposing additional costs: namely, externalities. That is, the standard justification for altering the income tax for looking purely at income is that the behavior which results in the subsidy (tax) is socially beneficial (detrimental).
To see how the externality analysis might apply here, first consider that the wealth of each individual is society is to some degree dependent on the wealth of other members of society. If other members of society are wealthier, they will have more wealth which they can spend on the goods and services you provide. Each individual's wealth can then be viewed as a function of the wealth of society as a whole.
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That is,
The idea here is that given our personal characteristics (skills, preferences, etc.) other than individual wealth, each individuals' wealth is an increasing function of societal wealth. The intuition is that if other members of society are wealthier, they will have more to spend on whatever it is that we as individuals produce. This will then make each individual wealthier.
The aggregate of societal wealth will not have either the skewness or kurtosis observed by individual investors because it will be additively aggregate. That is, while my wealth enters into my own utility it also enters derivatively into the utility of all the other members of society (the assumption here is that the derivative is positive) and so there is an externality from wealth. Since this term in everyone's utility function is an additive aggregate of the wealth of the individuals in society only the mean and variance of the terms matter. We do not have to assume that everyone's wealth function is the same. 42 In summary, this argument is that given personal characteristics other than wealth, it better to live in wealthier society than a poor one.
Once one acknowledges that ∑ ~ is an important component of individual utility, the distribution of this term shows how the investment choices of others affect each individual's wealth. Since it apparent that this term is an additive aggregate, the distribution of the term ∑ ~ is more closely to normally distributed than each individual's .
Therefore, the mean and variance characteristics of each individual's wealth have an effect on wealth and therefore the utility of all other members of society. The higher moments, such as skewness will have little if any effect. Therefore, society have an incentive to encourage mean-variance optimization.
Lessons from Aggregation
From the preceding argument, we can see that within the constraints of the assumptions made, individual investors might prefer equity to a greater extent that might be socially beneficial. This is because individual investors would observe a level of positive skewness which would not be observed at the societal level.
This not only gives us a reason based on individual preferences for the debt equity distinction, but it also might help us to look at when we should consider something debt and when we should consider something equity. That is, because the distinction would be based on differences in skewness from those observed at the individual level versus those observed at the societal level, it is skewness characteristics that should be used to distinguish debt from equity. That is, the extent to which the instrument would share in the positive skewness of the potential returns of equity, even if the underlying returns are symmetrically distributed, that should distinguish what is denominated equity from that which is denominated debt.
The argument advanced in this section can be summed up as individuals prefer skewness, but from a societal perspective, this is not socially useful. However, at this stage we have assumed we have made many unrealistic assumptions. The argument in this section has assumed individuals can be described as having log utility functions. It has also assumed that the Merton model of corporate equity accurately describes the difference between the returns to corporate equity and debt. Also, this section at least initially assumed that returns on investments for each individual in each period are independent and identically distributed. The next section will discuss the implications of relaxing these assumptions.
Section 3. Relaxing the Main Assumptions
The analysis in Section II has made three main assumptions which will be relaxed in this section, in particular use of log utility, independence of returns, and the assumptions of the Merton model.
A. Relaxing the Assumption of Log Utility
In essence, the analysis in Section II has all been done under the assumption of log utility. While this is not necessarily an unusual assumption, as discussed further below, this is a somewhat restrictive assumption. Now, we shall attempt to generalize this argument beyond the use of log utility. In attempting to expand the scope of the argument, we first note that log utility is really just a special case of what is known as constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility.
The utility functions in CRRA family are of the form: We can note that to the extent that the coefficient of risk aversion is greater than one, this can be thought as the result of a concave transformation of log utility. That is, increasing the coefficient of risk aversion is akin to making the utility function more concave. Concave transformations of a variable reduces its variance. 43 We noted that under Donsker's theorem the key assumption which resulted in a process asymptotically approaching a Brownian motion was finite variance. Putting these strands together, if we impose a concave transformation on our log utility model, the variance of the process will reduce further, and since we have already assumed that the process have finite variance, the new transformed process must also have finite variance as well.
As a result, if we expand our model of utility to encompass utility expressed by CRRA utility functions, then we still obtain the same basic result. The additive aggregate sum of these transformed returns will still asymptotically approach a Brownian Motion.
B. Relaxing the Assumption of Independent Returns
The argument of Section II initially assumed that these individual returns are independent and identically distributed. We can note that to some extent even within Section II, we relaxed the assumption of identical distributions when in applying Donsker's theorem we allowed for time varying 43 Joshi, Supra note_ 21 expected values and variances. We could also do something similar with the argument based directly on cumulants. Recall the fact that for independent processes the cumulant will be the sum of the cumulants of the individual components. Then for any additive process, the cumulant of the sum is simply N times the average value of the cumulant. This resulted in the normalized cumulant for any order higher than two decreasing as N increased. So if the skewness of the returns varies over time, then if we simply use the average skewness for the period under study that will give us the correct value. Note that if skewness is persistent, but not caused by the market action itself (i.e., not dependent on the particular realization of the process), we still get the same result. That is, the skewness of the random walk created by adding the log returns would still diminish as more returns are added.
In dealing with the independence assumption, we note that there are a number of versions of the functional central limit theorem that allow for various levels of dependence in the individual component processes and still result in asymptotic convergence to a Brownian motion. In essence as long as whatever dependence there is among return distributions dies off reasonably quickly, we can still apply a central limit theorem. 44 Given that the dependence in stock market returns both in expected returns and even in variance appears to die off at least exponentially, this should be sufficient.
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One should note that skewness observed by individual investors does not completely have to disappear for the argument of this article to have force. As long as the skewness observed at the societal level is substantially diminished as compared to the individual level, there is an incentive for society to reduce the incentive for individuals to give value to skewness (or any of the higher moments of the distribution of returns).
As noted above the assumption of independence of returns is easier to make if we are aggregating over different time periods than if we are aggregating over different individuals within the same time period.
The notion that returns of different individuals within the same time are independent seems unlikely.
There is likely to be an important level of dependence between the members of society within the same time period.
There are at least a couple of responses to this line of argument. First, it is not unreasonable to argue that the government should have longer time horizon than individuals. Governments outlive each of the individual citizens. Society will continue (one hopes) after the individuals comprising it have died.
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Therefore, this societal aggregation should encompass more time periods than that of any given individual. So to some degree the social aggregation being discussed is over different time periods, for the which the independence assumption, or at least a diminishing dependence of returns is reasonable.
Second, while there will be some level of dependence between the returns of the members of society, it
will not be the case that these returns will be identical. In general, it is not the case that individuals can invest in the labor and real estate income of other members of society. That is, there is nothing like complete risk sharing in the financial markets. For example, a large portion of the business income of the United States is earned by many companies which do not have publicly traded interests. The risks and rewards of these companies are not shared with the market generally. In fact, because for most individuals the majority of their income is earned through their own labor, it is difficult to fully diversify its risk of this income. As result, societal aggregation within each time period might not be able to fully diversify skewness risk, it is still likely to substantially diminish it.
A related argument deals with the independence assumption is that if investors are fully diversified in the market one might think the aggregation over individual's argument may not have any force.
That is, if all investors simply purchased a market portfolio which represented a fully diversified investment in the entire market then aggregate skewness is essentially the same as faced by any individual. Adding up over individuals would simply be adding up over not merely realizations of the same process, but the same realization of the same process. In this case, skewness etc. would not dissipate. If we had a complete market and all investors were invested in the market portfolio, the skewness would automatically dissipate and aggregation at the societal level would not be meaningful.
However, as was pointed out in the CAPM debates (Roll 1977), the proper "market portfolio" to consider is the "full" market portfolio. That is, one would have to consider all possible investments, not merely investments like stocks and bonds etc. Such a portfolio would have to include not only the stock market including other securities such as REITs but also individual labor income, companies whose stock does not publicly trade (e.g. partnerships and S corporate income which as large as the subchapter C corporations whose interests). It is essentially impossible for investors to have a fully diversified market portfolio in the sense that the government does. Note that one of the stylized facts of market returns is that they have a non-zero skewness.
One interesting point of conjecture that arises from these considerations is that the positive skewness preference may be a reason that individuals do not hold a fully diversified portfolio. As is well known, 23 diversified portfolios can reduce variance for any given expected value. However, as described above a diversified portfolio is also likely to reduce the skewness of the portfolio. This is because the increase in wealth from a portfolio is also an additive process of the increase in wealth in the different components.
Therefore, one reason that individuals might not hold fully diversified portfolios is that they may prefer the skewness that portfolios which are not fully diversified can offer.
C. Expanding the Merton Model
The Merton made a number of stylized assumptions. However, the basic conclusion that the returns to creditors should be negatively skewed survives largely intact when looking at more realistic assumptions. Creditors of plain vanilla debt are at most entitled to return or principal plus interest. As a result creditor will not share in returns of a business beyond those necessary to pay the principal amount of the debt. Therefore, the argument that such returns are likely to be negatively skewed seems reasonably robust. Similarly, since the holders of corporate equity will be able to profit from returns to the business which far exceed those of the expected value of the returns, the notion that the returns on corporate equity will be positively skewed seems reasonable as well. As a result, it appears that the conclusions of the Merton model are robust to some reasonable relaxation of its highly stylized assumptions.
Section IV. Limitations of this Argument
The argument of this article has largely assumed that societal preferences and individual preferences are largely the same except for the fact that societal preferences are by nature the result of the aggregation of the preferences of a large number of individuals. However, it is not clear that this is true. For example, if as discussed in section III individuals are note really able to purchase a portfolio that diversifies risk equivalent to the risk of society as a whole, then individuals may be more risk averse than society might wish. If this is true and then since corporate equites bear a higher risk than corporate debt, it may be that the social incentive to encourage equity might be larger than the social incentive to diminish the incentive for individuals to value the higher moments of the distribution of returns. If people invest too much in corporate debt vis-à-vis societal preferences because they are too risk averse, then we have to offset the skewness preference and the risk aversion to see which should dominate.
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Furthermore, the argument so far made in this article is largely confined to the incentives we give to individuals. There is less of a reason to believe that institutions have the same level of positive skewness preference as individuals. First of all, because they have a much larger portfolio than individuals tend to have, they likely experience some of the aggregation effects and so are much more likely to have something closer to mean variance preferences. So bank debt for partnerships and other organizations is not likely to suffer from the same skewness preferences. That would mean that whatever preference that we give to corporate debt likely should not extend to debt held by institutions.
This argument has assumed that individuals risk aversion is approximately the same as societal risk aversion. However, if from a societal perspective some of the variance faced by individuals is dissipated, then it may be the case that comparing the desire for lower risk (debt over equity) versus the positive skewness (equity over debt) yields an indeterminate conclusion.
D. Conclusion
Based on these arguments one can see that a case can be made for a tax preference for debt capitalization over equity capitalization can be made. The purpose of this paper is to show that a case can be made for a tax preference for corporate debt over corporate equity based on the differences in return characteristics of each.
In some sense state governments tax this preference through the use of lotteries. If individuals are not taking on enough risk, may want to encourage use of equity. There are too many answers to the equity premium puzzle.
One important take away from this argument is that it can help to shape the discussion of the rules under tax rules such as IRC section 385 which allow for the Treasury to draft rules concerning the differences between debt and equity. The analysis in this article indicates that the proper focus of these rules should the skewness of the returns.
Appendix
Diagram I.
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Diagram II (these charts assume that the principal value of the debt is 50 and the horizontal axis is the value of the assets in the corporation) 
Debt Value
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